The abuse of government and public resources for the propaganda in favor of Mr. Ahamdinejad was widely reported. The partisan support of the national radio and TV broadcasting organization in favor of Ahamdinejad continued until the last moments of the election campaign.
The abuse of government and public resources for the purpose of propaganda favoring Mr. Ahamdinejad was widely reported. The partisan support of the national radio and TV broadcasting organization in favor of Ahamdinejad continued until the last moments of the election campaign.
Support by Supreme Leader
Ahamdinejad repeatedly enjoyed the support of supreme leader and the high ranking officers of the Revolutionary Guards both of which are legally forbidden.
This propaganda was over and above the repeatedly publicized support of Ahmadinejad by the Supreme Leader as well as the high ranking officers of the Revolutionary Guards. Interestingly, all such actions are forbidden under the election regulation of the IRI.
Irregularities
Admission card for representatives of candidates:
The ministries of interior staff refused or hesitated to issue admission cards for the representative of the candidates which would have allowed them access the ballot collection sites.
In one stated case, the election management staff of Mr. Karoubi asked for 3100 admission cards for its representatives overseeing the polling procedure in ballot centers in Teheran. Only a few of them received the admission card on time .
In the case of the candidate Mr. Mousavi his request for the issuance of admission cards for his representatives was either neglected or the cards were issued with the wrong names. In a large number of cases, the pictures of female representatives were attached to the cards of their male colleagues and vice versa thus denying them access to the polling stations. Furthermore it was reported that in numerous cases the admission cards of the observers for one candidate were sent to the observers of another creating a confusing situation which was never resolved due to the shortage of time until the start day of the elections.
Polling Coupons, Amassed but not Available
Although the national registration office had announced the number of citizens eligible to vote in the presidential elections as 46,200,000, the government amassed 59,600,000 ballots. An additional 2.5 million coupons had been printed without any serial numbers , .
Amazingly in spite of this fact, a shortage of electoral coupons was observed in many regions of the country including Tabriz, Shiraz and North- West- and East-Teheran in the first hours of the polling.
Voting and Counting
According to the election law the ballot boxes have to be inspected prior to the being sealed by the representatives of the candidates. This indispensable requirement was not fulfilled in the majority of the polling stations. Thus thousands of the representatives of Mr. Mousavi were not allowed to fulfill their most important role as observers. According to Mr. Mousavi, in many cases the number of the admission cards allocated to his representatives did not correspond with the number of ballot boxes to be inspected so the access by thousands of his observers was denied in this manner as well .
The total number of mobile ballot boxes was remarkably high at 14,000 , . These were used even in locations where the distance to the standing ballot boxes was some ten meters. The vast majority of the mobile ballot boxes were not observed by the candidates’ representatives opening the door for further fraud.
According to Mr. Mousavi, the representatives of the candidates were not allowed to participate in the procedure of registering the results of counting at the majority of the ballot boxes, thus denying them any possibility to verify the results.
Finally, in order to disturb the communication between the representatives with their centers, the short message service (SMS) as the only means for their communication was interrupted in the entire country.
All three candidates, Mr. Mousavi, Mr. Karoubi and Mr. Rezai have announced that they do not have any hint how the final count of the votes was calculated with the total absence of any representatives on behalf of the candidates. Apparently, this final decision was made in a room inside the interior ministry in the presence of the Minister, Mr. Mahsouli, and Mr. Daneshjou, the head of the elections office plus a third unknown person.
At those few sites where the representatives of the candidates were allowed to act as observers, there was absolutely no correspondence between the reported results by the observers and those published officially .
Discussion and comparison of the results
The turn out of over 100%
According to a conservative candidate Mr. Rezai, in 170 cities the percentages of voters reached 100% and more. Meanwhile in a broadcast by the Second Channel of the state TV, the spokesman of Guardian Council confirmed the same outcome but only for 50 cities. The officially data published by the institutes of the IRI indicate that in two provinces Yazd and Mazandaran the turnout was higher than 100% and four more provinces around 95% .
At least in the following 40 cities across the country the total turnout figures are between 100% and 140%:
Taft 141%, Mehriz 121%, Saddough 111%, Tabas 101%, Bafgh 100%, Ardestan 101%, Tiran 108%, Chadegan 120%, Khonsar 100%, Fereydounshahr 108%, Kouhrang 132%, Ardegan 104%, Sarbishe 105%, Ghaenat 101%, Bardaskan 102%, Chenaran 104%, Khalilabad 103%, Khavaf 104%, Rashtkhar 101%, Fariman 105%, Baghemalek 106%, Roudbar Jonoub 121%,
Ghaleganj 112%, Dana 127%, Behmayi 113%, Boyerahmad 105%, Bandargaz & Minoudasht 101%, Siyahkal 104%, Shaft 101%, Masal 104%, Delfan 110%, Selsele 112%, Nour 104%, Galougah 103%, Mahmoudabad 102%, Nekah&Ramsar 101%, Aboumousa 115%, Bandarlange 100%, Roudan 104%
Voting Pattern in the IRI:
Consequence of higher participation
During the last elections at national or regional levels it turned out that the higher the participation of the citizens the better the chance of reformist candidates.
For instance when the reformist President Khatami was elected in a landslide victory (with 70% of the votes) the participation was high at 80%.
On the other hand when Ahmadinejad was elected to the post of Tehran Mayor, only 15% of the eligible inhabitants of Tehran took part in the polling and his personal result was around 3% of the entire eligible vote.
Another example: The turnout figure for the presidential election in 2005 leading to the victory of Ahmadinejad was allegedly 60% nationwide . This figure was in real terms, slightly lower than 50% but by manipulating the actual number of eligible voters it was engineered to appear as 60% of the total eligible population of the IRI.
Ethnical Effect
The ethnic mix of the Iranian population has affected the election in the IRI.
During the past years the elections in the provinces have always shown a strong tendency to favor the ethnic candidates in their own ethnic territories.
Looking at the results of the 2005 presidential elections (table 2), whilst Ahamdinejad and Karoubi were competing in the provinces of Lorestan and the neighboring province of Kermanshah, the vote count for Mr. Karoubi, born in a city in Lorestan, was 53.9% and 33.3% respectively. The same figures for Mr. Ahamdinejad, not a native of the aforementioned provinces, were 8.5% and 9.3%. Speaking in absolute terms: While the vote count for Karoubi in Lorestan was reduced by a factor of almost 10 (from 440,247 to 44,036) regards 2005, the figure in favor of Ahamdinejad was increased by the factor 10 (69,710 to 677,829). This require that all of the new voters (caused by the higher participation), plus the 2005 voters for conservatives and for Rafsanjani, plus almost 49% of the reformist voters must have cast their ballots in the basket of Ahamdinejad.
According to an analysis of Chatham House in recent elections Ahamdinejad must have acquired in one third of the provinces the entire votes for conservatives, plus Rafsanjani, plus all new voters (due to higher turnout), plus 44% of the reformists votes which have been collected in 2005.
Such a swing of votes in general and from Karoubi in particular to Ahamdinejad is almost impossible under the prevailing ethnic tendencies given above.
Let us now consider the case of a little known candidate for the presidential elections of 2005, that of Mr. Mehralizadeh, a reformist candidate from Azerbaijan (West- and East-Azerbaijan and Ardebil, table 3, table 4 and table 5) having no support from reformist parties. His vote counts outside the provinces of his origin tended towards marginal figures (0.8% in Lorestan, 1.6% in Kermanshah and country wide 4.5%). But in his own home provinces Mr. Mehralizadeh had the highest share of the votes with regard to all other candidates (27.7% East-Azerbaijan, 19.3% West-Azerbaijan and 22.6% in Ardebil).
Province of Ardebil, a Specific Case Uttering the Effect of Ethnicity
The significance of the ethnic-driven voting pattern is further emphasized if we look at the votes of Mr. Ahamdinejad in the province of Ardabil where he was a well-known person having been the provincial governor for 4 years (table 5). In the 2005 presidential elections Ahamdinejad earned just 6.9% of the province’s votes compared with 22.6 in favor of the poorly known Azerbaijani candidate, namely Mr. Mehralizadeh who was an ethnic Azeri himself.
The voting patterns demonstrate the known strong ethnic tendency, especially for voters to vote for candidates of their ethnicity. This finding makes it implausible that Mr. Ahamdinejad has defeated Mr. Mousavi, the well-known and famous son of Azerbaijan and prime minister of IRI during the eight hard years of the Iran-Iraq war, even in his own home provinces.
Overall Map of the Voting Pattern 2005
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of the vote counts for Ahamdinejad and Karoubi in the course of 2005 presidential election in all provinces of Iran. It suggests that in the rural and periphery area where predominantly the ethnic minorities are living, the share of Karoubi is higher than that of Ahamdinejad. This fact contradicts the homogeneous distribution as well as the high level of the vote counts of Ahamdinejad across the country in 2009 elections.
The analysis of the data by the Chatham group (Ansari et. al.) questions also the credibility as well as the plausibility of the 2009 election figures published by interior ministry. In particular it questions:
• The turn out of 100% and more in at least two provinces and many more cities
• On the basis of the data from the elections 1997, 2001 and 2005 in the IRI it concludes: “That the countryside always votes for conservatives is a myth”
• The higher participation of the voters can not be considered as a reason for the alleged success of Ahmadinejad
